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Abstract 
 
Public management reforms are usually underpinned by arguments that they will make the 
public administration system more effective and efficient. In practice, however, it is very hard 
to determine whether a given reform will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
public administration system in the long run. Here, I shall examine how the concept of the 
soft budget constraint (SBC) introduced by János Kornai (Kornai 1979, 1986; Kornai, Maskin 
and Roland 2003) can be applied to this problem. In the following, I shall describe some steps 
of the Hungarian public administration reforms implemented by the Orbán government from 
2010 onward and analyze them, focusing on which measures harden and which ones soften 
the budget constraint of the actors of the Hungarian public administration system. In the 
literature of economics, there is some evidence-based knowledge on how to harden/soften the 
budget constraint, which improves/reduces the effectiveness and hence the efficiency of the 
given system. My conclusion is that the concept of SBC can significantly contribute to public 
management studies by deepening our knowledge on what public administration reforms lead 
to a more efficient and effective public administration system. 
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Introduction 
The goal of this study is to introduce the soft budget constraint (SBC) as an analytical tool in 
public management studies. The SBC syndrome became a household word in economic 
studies1 in the wake of Kornai’s works on the characteristic traits of the socialist system; the 
concept itself gradually made its way into other fields of the social sciences too, such as 
sociology2, political sciences3, regional studies4 and international relations5 as well as in 
analyses of certain public services such as health care economics.6 
 The concept itself is applied in many ways. It is used for explaining the differences in the 
efficiency of private and public enterprises, the debt spiral in regional public administration, 
the emergence of the 2007/8 economic crisis, the problems in the efficiency of organizations 
                                                 
1
  I found 126 studies that used the concept of SBC in the 20 leading economic journals (with the highest 5-
year impact factor). 
2
  Cf., e.g., King & Sznajder (2006). I found 12 studies that used the concept of SBC in the 20 leading 
sociology journals (with the highest 5-year impact factor).  
3
  Cf., e.g., Tjerbo & Hagen (2009). I found 30 studies that used the concept of SBC in the 20 leading 
political sciences journals (with the highest 5-year impact factor).  
4
  I found 58 studies that used the concept of SBC in the 20 leading regional studies journals (with the highest 
5-year impact factor). 
5
  Cf., e.g., Schultz & Weingast (2003). I found 51 studies that used the concept of SBC in the 20 leading 
international relations journals (with the highest 5-year impact factor). 
6
  Cf., e.g., Piacenza & Turati (2014). I found 18 studies that used the concept of SBC in the 20 leading health 
care economics journals (with the highest 5-year impact factor). 
offering public services as well as for the various problems in the efficiency in economic 
policies such as tax policy measures, investment decisions, corruption and organizational 
sociology issues and the poor allocation policy of the European Union. The SBC syndrome is 
principally used in the context of its impact on the efficiency of the central government’s 
operation. Interestingly enough, while the concept has been extensively applied in studies on 
public services, there seems to have been little interest in its possible application in analyses 
of the transformation of the state structure, i.e. in public administration reforms, aside from 
fiscal federalism and decentralization. In this article we demonstrate that SBC can be used for 
a better understanding of the overall goals of public administration reforms and for predicting 
their impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of public administration. 
 This study is organized as follows: First, I shall discuss the concept of SBC, followed by 
an overview of the impact of SBC on public administration organizations. In the same section, 
I shall demonstrate why politicians tend to contribute to the emergence of an SBC syndrome, 
despite the voluminous literature on its harmful effects. The next section covers the reform 
measures that can soften or harden budget constraints, illustrating these with examples taken 
from the post-2010 public administration reforms in Hungary. The last section concludes. 
 
What is SBC? 
The concept of SBC was introduced by János Kornai (1979, 1980, 1986, 1998, 2014) and his 
colleagues (Kornai, Maskin and Roland 2003). Initially, Kornai used this term for describing 
the socialist system. The SBC syndrome essentially means that an organization (such as a 
state enterprise or a local government) can realistically expect to be bailed out by another 
organization (e.g. a ministry) if it faces bankruptcy. The SBC syndrome emerges when the 
organization to be bailed out has the expectation that it will be bailed out and on the basis of 
which it changes its behavior (spends more than the budget constraint would allow). 
However, the bailout of one particular organization does not imply that a country’s economy 
is characterized by SBC. The main issue is whether there exists a tradition of bailouts in a 
particular society – in other words, whether behavioral patterns typical of SBC have evolved. 
 SBC can be described as a social relationship between interacting organizations. We can 
identify two actors in this relationship: one in need of the bailout, the other willing to provide 
support. The two actors are not equal: their relationship is vertical because the organization 
requiring the bailout is at the mercy of the one providing the support, i.e. the former has a 
weaker, while the latter a stronger lobbying power. Many actors can be in need of a bailout, 
including profit-oriented companies (banks, multinational companies, sports clubs),7 public 
institutions offering public services (e.g. Hungarian hospitals in the last decade),8 local or 
regional governments (e.g. local governments in Hungary in 2012),9 private citizens 
(household forex debts in Hungary)10, countries (Greece)11, non-governmental organizations, 
or even large-scale investment projects (e.g. underground railway construction in Hungary)12. 
The central government is the prime rescuer, but banks and international and regional 
organizations (IMF, EU) and their foundations can also take on this role (Kornai 2014). 
 The two actors interact with different motivations. The organization in need of the bailout 
exceeded its budget constraint owing to the expansion drive after which, obviously, it starts 
looking for a supporting organization otherwise it would go bankrupt. The propensity to 
expand can also be noted in the central government’s organizations, namely the ability for 
                                                 
7
  Fogel, Morck and Yeung (2008), Storm and Nielsen (2012). 
8
  Kornai (2009), Levaggi and Montefiori (2013). 
9
  Cf. Baskaran (2012). 
10
  Bohle (2014). 
11
  Katsimi, Moutos, Pagoulatos and Sotiropoulos (2014), Benczes (2011). 
12
  Cf. Inderst, Mueller and Münnich (2007). 
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excessive bureaucracy (Downs 1967). State actors are also spurred to expenditures over their 
budget constraint because politicians have a predilection for softening budget constraints to 
increase their popularity, which is best illustrated the budgets of election years (Shi and 
Svensson 2006). 
 The motivations of the rescuing organizations can be quite complex. The central 
government can decide to rescue a particular organization for a variety of reasons. It can fear, 
amongst others, 
–  that the social cost of the bankruptcy of a large organization will be higher than the 
cost of the bailout, 
–  that the bankruptcy of a large organization will spill over to other sectors and cause 
economic recession, 
–  that the bankruptcy of a local or regional self-government will deprive the citizens 
living there of basic public services, 
–  that the bankruptcy of a large organization can precipitate a regional micro-crisis, 
which in turn would enhance inequalities that could lead to social tensions (Kornai 
2014).  
 The ideal of solidarity and equity can also induce the central government to decide on a 
bailout. It can hardly afford to let citizens receive lower-quality health care services in certain 
regions because this would run counter to the ideal of horizontal equity. Another oft-voiced 
argument in support of bailouts is the protection of national interests: in these cases, the 
bailouts rescue organizations that enjoy a special nimbus or reputation, or perhaps a brand 
name, or their activity is crucial to national defense. In addition to the above, the creation of a 
clientele can push political decision-makers towards softening the budget constraints of 
certain organizations from public funds. These organizations are usually directly linked to the 
political decision-makers’ person or their party. Finally, decision-makers can be tempted to 
soften the budget constraint if they can increase their own personal wealth, implying a close 
relation between SBC and corruption (Broadman and Recanatini 2002). We can also 
supplement this list with motivation of the politicians to hold in check the organizations of the 
public administration. The aim is not to strengthen the control over public administration but 
to establish a system in which loyalty and unconditional obedience are the key success 
factors.  
 According to Kornai (2014, 32-33), the SBC syndrome encourages wanton spending and 
reduces the price and cost sensitivity of decision-makers. Moreover it alters the outlook of the 
managers of organizations, whereby they devote less attention and energy to the 
organization’s basic tasks (e.g. to quality and cost-effectiveness in the case of public 
services), and instead concentrate on fostering relations with potential rescuers (politicians) 
and use a part of their resources for serving them loyally. To the end of this process SBC 
undermines social morals and leads to a process of redistribution that many find unfair or 
inequitable. 
 Even though governmental decision-makers are aware of these hazards, they are 
incapable of truly committing themselves to hardening budget constraints. This is generally 
described as time inconsistency, and countless studies discussing SBC have been devoted to 
this issue (Dewatripont and Maskin 1995). In our viewpoint, however it is highly questionable 
whether politicians are candidly committed to pursue hard budget constraint because they 
would lose an effective tool to enforce loyalty from public administration.13 
                                                 
13
  The literature of time inconsistency argues that while decision-makers appear to have serious intentions 
that organizations on the verge of bankruptcy that request help will not be financed any further, they are 
unable to keep their promise and repeatedly bail out organizations in trouble. Even though decision-
makers’ repeated bailouts aggravate the SBC syndrome because it socializes organizations that they will 
 What are the effects of SBC in public administration? 
After introducing the notion we present our hypothesis why SBC evolves in the public 
administration and how it distorts the operation of the system. The SBC syndrome evolves in 
the public administration system when politicians send signals to the public organizations (in 
fact to the top officials of these organizations) that their survival depends solely on their 
loyalty to the political elite. Because the SBC syndrome transforms the motivations of the 
organizations, they will focus on serving the incumbent government’s will and become 
blindly obedient. SBC modifies the goals of these organizations. Their primary goal will be to 
please politicians; citizens will lose their central role, meaning that the public administration’s 
input-based legitimacy (Schmidt 2013) loses its importance. The distorted aims also change 
the behavior of public organizations. This can be captured in all processes such as HRM 
processes (professional skills are not as important as political loyalty), financial management 
processes (the focus is not on cost saving or increasing own revenues, but on gathering state 
funding), strategic management processes (strategy loses its importance since all important 
decisions are made at the political level). From now on, political connections rather than the 
improvement of performance are necessary for receiving additional resources and ensuring 
survival. 
 When the SBC syndrome is present, organizations of the public administration compete 
for stronger political connections and for receiving more political attention. Since the state has 
limited resources, this is a typical zero-sum-game competition which creates a milieu of 
mistrust between the organizations and hinders cooperation. Efficient vertical (hierarchical) 
coordination is a crucial question in a system, while horizontal coordination is mostly 
subsidiary. 
 Why do politicians trigger the SBC syndrome, if its impact on the public administration 
system is so negative? By using SBC as an incentive, politicians can maximize their power 
over the public administration system in the short run, which helps them pursue their personal 
or party interests (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). 
 
Figure 1. The chain of causality in the evolution of the SBC syndrome in public 
administration 
                                                                                                                                                        
receive help in the future too, their decisions are also rational because the impact of the anticipated social 
problems without a bailout would be unforeseeable. This is why the central government provides help to 
local governments (a settlement’s inhabitants cannot remain without public lighting) and bankrupt hospitals 
(a region cannot remains without health care), and completes construction projects despite the multiple 
budget expenditures. 
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Politicians 
follow their 
self-interest; 
they want to 
use public 
administration 
to realize their 
own goals.
Politicians 
support the 
evolution (or
escalation) of 
the SBC 
syndrome in 
public 
administration.
Politicians 
support public 
administration 
reforms which 
leads to the 
evolution (or
escalation) of 
the SBC 
syndrome in 
public 
administration.
Organization 
in public 
administration 
modifies their 
aims and 
behaviour.
The input-
based 
legitimacy and 
the efficiency 
of public 
administration 
decrease.
SBC is part of 
the norms, 
habits and the 
culture of the 
given society.
 
Source: own compilation, but see also Table 1 in Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2004, 1107) 
 
 Following the description of the chain of causality, I shall review certain public 
administration reforms, which can promote the softening of the budget constraint of an 
organization in public administration. These reform measures are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Reforms softening the budget constraint in public administration 
Reform steps softening the 
budget constraint 
How does the reform impact the organizations of public 
administration? 
Centralization 
Centralization may soften the local governments’ budget 
constraint, because the central government may selectively 
subsidize some of the local governments, for instance those, 
where the mayor or the majority of the council are from the 
same political party as the central government. 
Decentralization 
Decentralization may soften the budget constraint of local 
governments since they have the incentive to exceed their 
budget constraint (Breuillé & Vigneault 2010). 
Narrowing freedom of 
information (FoI) 
By narrowing FoI, citizens lose opportunity to punish the 
opportunistic behavior of organizations and politicians. It 
increases information asymmetry, which also softens the 
budget constraint. 
Using selective regulation on 
the allocation of financial 
resources 
Ambiguous regulation itself softens the budget constraint. 
Regulations, which are not compulsory for all units of public 
administration, are the hotbed of SBC, because they broaden 
the room for the opportunistic behavior of organizations and 
politicians. 
Weakening market 
competition 
The market prefers efficient organizations and eliminates 
inefficient ones. Weakening the market pressure (eliminating 
competition) softens the budget constraint. 
Less and unfair competition The state can also demand competition for its grants. 
for state grants However, less or unfair and not transparent competition sends 
signals to organizations that performance in not a key factor 
to be successful. To the end the budget constraint of the 
organization softens. 
Weakening internal control 
Weaker internal control of performance increases 
opportunities for overusing financial resources and softens 
the budget constraint. 
Weakening external control 
Weaker external control of performance – by not applying 
any audit and reporting systems or by not employing any 
external controllers/auditors – also loosens the pressure on an 
organization to harden its budget constraint. 
Reprivatization 
Reprivatization prevents organizations from market 
competition. Since market hardens budget constraint, 
reprivatization softens it. 
Decreasing the personal 
responsibility of decision- 
makers 
Stronger personal responsibility of decision-makers not to 
exceed the organization’s budget hardens the budget 
constraint. Weakening the personal responsibility softens the 
budget constraint. 
Monopolization 
Monopolies usually have softer budgets than organizations in 
oligopoly or competitive conditions. Monopolization 
eliminates competition and softens the budget constraint. 
Blurring the boundary 
between politics and 
administration 
By blurring the two spheres and by not giving them clear 
competencies softens the budget constraint. Separation is 
needed because politicians and public servants have distinct 
motivations. Both approaches are necessary for a well-
functioning public sector, but the predominance of one over 
the other is harmful. If one becomes dominant, it may soften 
the budget constraint. 
Restricting the freedom and 
autonomy in strategic planning 
Autonomy in strategic planning at the organizational level 
makes the leaders of the organizations more responsible. 
With such autonomy, professional aspects are considered 
more seriously. Without these the budget constraint of the 
organizations softens. 
Source: Own compilation 
 
 Please note that this list does not contain direct SBC steps such as bailouts or bad loans, 
but are rather reform measures that create institutional conditions for the emergence of the 
SBC syndrome. It must also be noted that both centralization and decentralization can be 
useful for hardening the budget constraint, but they can also foster the evolution of the SCB 
syndrome (Kornai, Maskin and Roland 2004, 1116). 
 After depicting the effect of the SBC syndrome in public administration, I shall 
demonstrate how public administration reforms can be analyzed in the context of SBC. Four 
different measures of the Hungarian public administration reforms introduced by the Orbán 
government after 2010 are taken as examples. 
 
Some measures of the Hungarian public administration reforms  
Four important measures of the Hungarian public administration reform are listed below, 
which serve as short case studies of how SBC can be used for analyzing the impact of public 
administration reforms. 
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1. Establishment of County (Metropolitan) Government Offices. The government created 
new, general-purpose, middle-tier administrative organs in each county and the capital 
city (Act CXXVI of 2010; Government Decree 288/2010 (XII. 21.)) headed by 
government commissioners who are explicitly political figures (oftentimes former MPs of 
the governing party) appointed by the Prime Minister. This reform step centralized the 
public administration system, hence these County (and District) Offices took over local 
governments’ competencies, but simultaneously it deconcentrated territorially the medium 
level management of state administration. The County Government Offices took over not 
only some tasks from the local governments, but integrated seventeen different specialized 
administrative services (such as public health or veterinary authorities).  
The aim of the politicians was to reinforce their power over the public administration by 
applying centralization and blurring the boundary between professionals and politicians. 
The reform increases the financial and personal dependence of the merged organizations 
from political actors. Due to the politicization the attention of these organizations changes: 
they focus more on actual political needs and professional considerations become 
secondary. These phenomena are typical signs of the presence of SBC; we can predict that 
the efficiency and citizen orientation of these organizations will decrease.  
 
2. Creation of mammoth agencies responsible for middle management in each sector.14 The 
best examples of these agencies are the National Institute for Quality and Organizational 
Development in Health Care and Medicines (health care); Klebelsberg Institution 
Maintenance Center (public education); General Directorate of Social Affairs and Child 
Protection (social care).15 The purpose in the creation of these agencies is to strengthen the 
vertical coordination and the political control over these sectors, and also to standardize 
strategic management processes.  
The means whereby the reforms were implemented are the following: (a) strong 
centralization of public services (health care, public education, social services) at the 
central level (the local level lost its importance as a public service provider); (b) 
organizational mergers and termination of organizations; (c) direct ministerial / political 
control over public service providers (politicization is so strong that even primary school 
or hospital directors are appointed directly by the ministers).16 The reform contributes to 
the escalation of SBC syndrome in the concerned sectors by politicization and 
centralization. Moreover by narrowing the autonomy of the public services providers and 
by decreasing competition between these organizations the government affirms SBC 
syndrome into these sectors. 
    
3. Radical elimination of the career-type civil service system. After 2010, new acts on civil 
servants literally abolished all protection against arbitrary dismissal, and dismissal without 
any justification became possible (Act CLXXIV of 2010, §17, section 1). Although the 
Constitutional Court later annulled the most severe changes, the law continues to stipulate 
that a civil servant can be dismissed on grounds of unworthiness of office or loss of the 
superior’s confidence (Act CXCIX of 2011, §63, section 2, points a and e). These steps 
                                                 
14
  The central government took over from sub-national governments the key operational tasks of supervising 
primary and secondary schools and hospitals, and incorporated these institutions into sectoral mammoth 
agencies. 
15
  These are truly mammoth agencies: the Klebelsberg Institution Maintenance Center has 140,650 employees 
since all the teachers and the staff of primary and secondary schools are employed by the agency. 
16
  The unique characteristic of the system is that there is a strong personal dependence even at the lowest 
levels. As a result of centralized decision-making, local needs are not considered when appointing 
managers. 
significantly contribute to blurring the boundary between politicians and bureaucrats, and 
lead to the over-politicization of the civil service. Moreover, superiors’ ability to hire and 
fire contrary to the rule of law is barely limited. The aim of the reform is clear: to insure 
the loyalty and obedience of the civil servants to the incumbent government. This step 
converts the institutional environment and helps to evolve the SBC syndrome in the public 
sector. Since the behavior of the civil servants changes (focus on political instead of 
professional standpoints), it is easily forecasted that efficiency and citizen orientation will 
lose its importance. 
 
4. Modification of local governments’ financial system. The Orbán government cut back the 
financial autonomy of local governments and decreased their financial support. On the 
revenue side, the government radically decreased local government funding from 11.8% 
of GDP in 2010 to 10% in 2013 (Eurostat). The financial latitude of local governments 
was further narrowed by “earmarking” 100% of central governmental grants. Currently, 
local governments must obtain prior government approval when entering into 
commitments that give rise to debt. The most important shared tax, personal income tax, 
disappeared from the local government financial system, though it had been a key source 
of revenue since 1990. On the expenditure side, the resulting cut-backs are even more 
drastic. Total expenditure fell from 12.6% in 2010 to 7.5% in 2013 (Eurostat). These 
figures reflect the measures – discussed earlier – transferring key local public services 
under central government control. 
Using SBC as an analytical tool sheds light on the some features of this reform step. 
Stronger control over the credit taking of local governments could harden the budget 
constraint. However, due to the selective decision making process (the government makes 
unique decision on each case) we cannot preclude that political interests distort the 
decisions so that the budget constraint of the local governments led by government party 
softens. We may also conclude that the centralization of the competencies of local 
governments hardens the budget constraint of local governments, however this is not true 
for the organizations which execute these tasks such as hospitals and primary and 
secondary schools.17 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the potentials of using SBC in the analysis of public 
administration reforms. First, I introduced the concept of SBC. In the second section, I 
focused on the possible effects of the SBC syndrome on the public administration system. The 
motivations of politicians and the means whereby the budget constraint could be hardened / 
softened were also examined in this section. Finally, I offered some examples of how SBC 
can promote a better understanding of specific public administration reform measures. I used 
four reform measures of the Orbán government.  
 When a reform measure softens the budget constraint or “merely” creates an institutional 
environment in which politicians have the power to makes public servants vulnerable to 
political influence at the operational level, the organizations of the public sector change their 
aims and their behavior. The SBC syndrome makes the public administration system simply a 
tool of the political power of the incumbent government. In that case, public administration 
obediently follows the commands of the political elite, without focusing on the trust of the 
citizens or on professional considerations. 
                                                 
17
 It is highly questionable whether centralization hardens the budget constraint (Ben-Bassat, Dahan, and Klor 
2013). 
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